three circumstances with a major influence on the best to upkeep | Burns & Levinson LLP

Hi,

As promised, here is a detailed explanation of the new Supreme Court (“SJC”) decisions on the Alimony Reform Act from my talented and knowledgeable partner, Robin Lynch Nardone.

Robin Lynch Nardone, Partner at Burns & Levinson LLP

Preferably,
Nancy

On January 30, 2015, the SJC issued three decisions that had a significant impact on the right to request an amendment to a maintenance order issued prior to the Massachusetts Alimony Reform Act. The SJC relied on the non-codified provisions of the Maintenance Reform Act to determine that for maintenance cases decided before March 1, 2012, only the time limits on the maintenance payment apply, but not the age and civil partnership provisions. Uncoded provisions of a legal act reflect the view of the legislature on a particular aspect of the functioning of the legal act and are not the source of the substantive provisions of the law. Below are the details of the three cases.

Doctor against doctor

Joe and Dorothy divorced in 1992 after more than 20 years of marriage. They signed an agreement in which Joe agreed to pay Dorothy $ 200 a week child support until she died or remarried. The maintenance provisions of the agreement have been moved into the divorce decree, which means that due to a material change in circumstances, the maintenance is subject to a future change.

In 2013, Joe filed a lawsuit to change his maintenance obligation because he was past full retirement age (he was 69 years old at the time), was in fact retired, and Dorothy was no longer on child support. Joe claimed that the provisions of the new Maintenance Act codified at MGL c. 208, sec. 49 (f) concerned him. Section 49 (f) provides that “general fixed-term maintenance plans end when a payer reaches full retirement age”.

The court of first instance dismissed Joe’s lawsuit after the hearing, ruling that the Maintenance Act retirement plan does not apply to cases that were settled before the law went into effect. The court of first instance also found that Dorothy was still on maintenance needs. Joe appealed the district court’s decision. The SJC agreed with the trial judge and ruled that the legislature intended that the retirement plan would only apply prospectively and therefore the retirement plan would not be applicable to Joe’s amendment.

When it found that the legislature intended that the age regulations should only apply prospectively and not retrospectively, the SJC oriented itself on the non-codified provisions of the Maintenance Reform Act. Section 4 of the uncoded provisions of the Alimony Reform Act provides that Section 49 MGL c. 208 “applies prospectively, so that maintenance judgments issued before March 1, 2012 only expire after such judgments, after a subsequent amendment or as otherwise provided in this Act.” Section 4 (b) provides the only exception that is that Maintenance decisions that exceed the deadlines can be changed without any additional material change in circumstances. Section 5 of the non-codified law provides for the dates on which those liable for maintenance can file their action for amendment if the deadlines have been exceeded. Section 6 then provides

“Notwithstanding clauses (1) through (4) of Section 5 of this Act, any payer who has reached full retirement age as defined in Section 48 of Chapter 208 of the General Acts or who will reach full retirement age on or before March January 2015 Submit an amendment complaint on or after March 1, 2013. “

The SJC decided that Sections 4, 5 and 6 should be read together and not separately. The words “any payer who has reached full retirement age” only applies to a payer who has reached the permanent limit and has also reached or will reach full retirement age. The stipulation that §§ 4, 5 and 6 of the uncodified sections of the Maintenance Reform Act must be read together thwarts the rights of a payer who has been married for more than 20 years after a change is made solely on the basis of reaching full retirement age. In addition, the deadlines do not apply to a payer who has been married for more than 20 years.

While the SJC has stated that this is the legislature’s intention in passing the Alimony Reform Act, one has to wonder if this was really the intention.

Rodmann v. Rodman

George and Roberta Rodman were divorced in April 2008 after 39 years of marriage. At that point, they signed an agreement asking George to pay Roberta $ 1,539 a week of child support until his death, her death, or Roberta’s remarriage. The agreement was merged with the divorce decree, allowing for an amendment should there be a significant change in circumstances. In November 2013, at the age of 66, George filed an amendment action seeking to terminate his maintenance obligation due to reaching full retirement age under the Alimony Reform Act. George filed for an injunction to end his maintenance obligation and the trial judge reported the matter to the appellate court: Whether GL c. 208, sec. 49 (f) applies retrospectively to judgments issued before March 1, 2012. George requested a direct review by the SJC.

As in the Doktor case, the SJC noted that the legislature intended that only a permanently limited right to amendment could (but not always) be retrospectively applicable to existing maintenance judgments. General Laws c. 208, sec. 49 (f) (the retirement plan) does not apply retrospectively to alimony decisions in divorce judgments or separation agreements made prior to March 1, 2012. George is therefore not entitled to discharge.

Chin v. Merriot

In August 2011, Chester and Edith divorced after 12 years of marriage. At the time of the divorce, Chester was 67 years old and Edith was 69 years old. Chester and Edith signed an agreement that required Chester to pay $ 650 a month child support until either party died or Edith remarried. In March 2013, Chester filed an amendment complaint to redress his maintenance obligations based on (1) the fact that he was 68 years old, reaching full retirement age, and (2) the fact that Edith had been living with someone else quit and keep a household together for more than three months. Chester argued that full retirement age was a basis for termination of maintenance under MGL c. 208, sec. 49 (f) and living together is a basis for the suspension, reduction or termination of maintenance according to MGL c. 208, sec. 49 (d). After a hearing, the judge in the court of first instance found that neither the retirement provisions nor the cohabitation provisions were retroactive and Chester’s lawsuit was dismissed. Chester appealed.

For the same reasons set out in Doctor and Rodman, the SJC determined that the pension rules were prospective, not retroactive, and therefore Chester could not make a change based on reaching full retirement age alone. Chester was also already retired at the time of the divorce, so his retirement from work did not represent a significant change in circumstances.

As for coexistence, MGL c. 208, sec. 49 (d) provides

“General maintenance will be suspended, reduced or terminated if the beneficiary spouse lives together if the payer proves that the receiving spouse has kept a joint household with another person for at least 3 uninterrupted months within the meaning of this subsection.”

With regard to the non-codified provisions of the Maintenance Reform Act, the SJC once again stated that the intention of the legislature, as expressed in uncodified section 4 (b), is clear: GL c. 208, sec. 48 to 55 (including the provision on living together) “are not viewed as a significant change in circumstances that justify a change in the amount of existing maintenance judgments; provided, however, that existing maintenance judgments that exceed the time limit are deemed to be a significant change in the circumstances that justify a change. “

The result seems conspicuously unfair and unreasonable – someone who was divorced on the 1st day before cannot receive this discharge. While the SJC has made it clear that this was the legislature’s intention, the outcome appears to be contrary to what the Alimony Reform Act was supposed to achieve.

While the cohabitation rules do not apply to divorces that took place before March 2012, payers whose spouse is living with someone can still request a change due to a material change in circumstances. If living together results in a significant change in the recipient’s maintenance needs, the payer may be able to effect a change on this basis.