Hi,
As promised, here is a detailed explanation of the Supreme Judicial Court’s (“SJC”) recent decisions on the Alimony Reform Act from my talented and knowledgeable partner Robin Lynch Nardone.
Robin Lynch Nardone, Partner at Burns & Levinson LLP
Preferably,
Nancy
On January 30, 2015, the SJC entered three rulings that significantly affect the right to request a modification of a support order made before the passage of Massachusetts’ Alimony Reform Act. The SJC relied on the non-codified provisions of the Maintenance Reform Act to determine that for maintenance cases decided before March 1, 2012, only the time limits on the maintenance payment apply, not the age and cohabitation provisions. Uncodified provisions of a statute express the legislature’s view of some aspect of the operation of the statute and are not the source of the substantive provisions of the statute. Below are the details of the three cases.
Doctor V. Doctor
Joe and Dorothy divorced in 1992 after more than 20 years of marriage. They signed an agreement in which Joe agreed to pay Dorothy $200 a week in child support until her death or remarriage. The alimony provisions of the agreement passed into the divorce decree, meaning that the alimony is subject to future modification due to a material change in circumstances.
In 2013, Joe filed a complaint to change his child support obligation because he had passed full retirement age (he was 69 at the time), had actually retired and Dorothy no longer required child support. Joe claimed that the provisions of the new Child Support Act codified at MGL c. 208, sec. 49(f) applied to him. Section 49(f) provides that “general maintenance orders terminate when a payer reaches full retirement age.”
The trial court dismissed Joe’s complaint after the trial, finding that the retirement provisions of the Child Support Act do not apply to cases settled before the Act went into effect. The trial court also found that Dorothy was still in need of child support. Joe appealed the court’s decision. The SJC agreed with the trial judge, ruling that the legislature intended the retirement rule to apply only prospectively and therefore the retirement rule does not apply to Joe’s request for modification.
The SJC relied on the uncodified provisions of the Maintenance Reform Act to determine that the legislature’s intention was that the pension scheme should only be prospective and not retrospective. Section 4 of the uncodified provisions of the Alimony Reform Act provides that Section 49 MGL c. 208 “is intended to apply prospectively so that alimony orders made prior to March 1, 2012 shall terminate only after such judgment, upon subsequent amendment, or as otherwise provided in this Act.” Section 4(b) provides the only exception whereby alimony orders made before March 1, 2012 that exceed the duration limits need to be changed without an additional significant change in circumstances. Section 5 of the uncodified statute provides the dates for alimony payers to file their amendment claims if the time limits have been exceeded. Section 6 then provides that
“Notwithstanding clauses (1) through (4) of Section 5 of this Act, any payer who has reached full retirement age as defined in Section 48 of Chapter 208 of the General Acts, or who will reach full retirement age on or before March 1 March 2015 may file an amendment complaint on or after March 1, 2013.”
The SJC decided that Sections 4, 5 and 6 should be read together and not separately. The words “any payer who has reached full retirement age” apply only to a payer who has reached the permanent limit and who has also reached or will reach full retirement age. The requirement that sections 4, 5 and 6 of the uncodified sections of the Child Support Reform Act be read together thwarts the rights of any payer who has been married for more than 20 years to receive an amendment based solely on reaching full retirement age . In addition, the time limits do not apply to a payer who has been married for more than 20 years.
While the SJC has stated that this is the intention of the legislature in enacting the Alimony Reform Act, one has to wonder if that was really the intention.
Rodman vs. Rodman
George and Roberta Rodman divorced in April 2008 after 39 years of marriage. At that point, they signed an agreement requiring George to pay Roberta $1,539 per week in child support until his death, her death, or Roberta’s remarriage. The agreement was merged with the divorce decree, allowing for amendment should there be a material change in circumstances. In November 2013, at the age of 66, George filed an amendment action to end his maintenance obligations by virtue of reaching full retirement age under the Alimony Reform Act. George sought an injunction to end his alimony and the trial judge reported the following matter to the Court of Appeals: Whether GL c. 208, sec. 49(f) applies retrospectively to judgments rendered prior to March 1, 2012. George requested direct verification by the SJC.
As in the Doktor case, the SJC held that the legislature intended only a right to amendment based on duration limitations to apply retrospectively to existing maintenance decisions (but not always). General Laws c. 208, sec. 49(f) (the pension) does not apply retrospectively to maintenance orders in divorce decrees or separation agreements made before March 1, 2012. Therefore, George is not entitled to exoneration.
Chin versus Merriot
In August 2011, Chester and Edith divorced after 12 years of marriage. At the time of the divorce, Chester was 67 and Edith was 69. Chester and Edith signed an agreement obliging Chester to pay child support at a rate of $650 per month until either party died or Edith remarried. In March 2013, Chester filed an amended lawsuit to end his maintenance obligations based on (1) the fact that he was 68 years old, which was of full retirement age, and (2) the fact that Edith was with someone else had lived together and have been running a joint household for more than three months. Chester argued that full retirement age was a basis for termination of maintenance under MGL c. 208 sec. 49(f) and cohabitation is a basis for suspension, reduction or termination of maintenance under MGL c. 208, sec. 49(d). After a trial, the trial court judge ruled that neither the retirement provisions nor the cohabitation provisions apply retrospectively, and Chester’s suit was dismissed. Chester appealed.
For the same reasons set out in Doctor and Rodman, the SJC decided that the retirement provisions were prospective, not retroactive, and therefore Chester could not obtain a change solely by virtue of reaching full retirement age. Chester was also retired at the time of the divorce, so his retirement did not represent a material change in circumstances.
Regarding coexistence, MGL c. 208, sec. 49(d) provides that
“General alimony payments will be suspended, reduced or terminated where the recipient spouse is cohabiting if the payer establishes that the recipient spouse has shared a household with another person for an uninterrupted period of at least 3 months, as defined in this subsection.”
Looking at the uncodified provisions of the Support Reform Act, the SJC noted that the intent of the Legislature, as expressed in uncodified Section 4(b), is clear: GL c. 208, secs. 48-55 (including the cohabitation provision) “should not be regarded as a material change in circumstances justifying a change in the amount of existing maintenance orders; provided, however, that existing maintenance decisions that exceed the permanent limit will be considered a material change in circumstances justifying a change.”
The result appears strikingly unfair and unreasonable – someone divorced 1 day before cannot receive this discharge. While the SJC has made it clear that this was the intention of the legislature, the result appears to be at odds with what the Alimony Reform Act was intended to achieve.
While the cohabitation provisions do not apply to divorces that occurred before March 2012, payers whose spouse is cohabiting can still apply for a change due to a significant change in circumstances. If cohabitation results in a material change in the recipient’s support needs, the payer may be able to effect a change on that basis.
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