When a divorce case is settled by the parties entering into a written agreement, rather than hearing the case in its entirety and making the final decision in the form of a court judgment/judgment, the parties and their attorneys must exercise great care in drafting the agreement of the divorce case of the parties. When the parties enter into a “marital” arbitration agreement, also known as a “marital” arbitration agreement, the parties enter into a traditional contract. As such, marriage contracts are governed by contract law.
Many prenuptial agreements contain a provision on alimony, also known as alimony. Determining child support can be difficult and cause problems. In the most recent case, Long v. Long, 282 A.3d 694 (Pa. Super. 2022), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of contractual alimony and its intersection with the divorce statute.
The relevant facts of the Long case are as follows: The parties entered into a prenuptial agreement in June 2018 and the court issued a divorce decree two months later. In the marriage contract between the parties, the wife retained the previous marital domicile. The parties had two minor children, and the agreement included support provisions “to ensure that the wife can afford to remain in the marital home until both children graduate…”. Under the first section, headed “Maintenance,” the Agreement provided: “Except as provided below, the parties agree that neither party shall be entitled to spousal maintenance, alimony pendente lite, or alimony by virtue of this marriage.” The second part of paragraph 28 with the headline “Child Support” read: “The ‘husband’ agrees to pay child support at a rate of $1,800 per month. It is the intention of the parties to maintain a constant payment throughout the period until the last child graduates from high school in June 2024. Therefore, if the husband requests a change in child support during this period, then the difference between the child support and the $1,800 figure should be determined as alimony. In any event, child support and alimony payments will end after June 2024.”
The husband filed for a change in child support in the fall of 2020 as the parties began sharing custody of the remaining minor child and the wife remarried. The husband argued that the wife was barred from receiving alimony because of her remarriage and his child support should be modified downwards since the wife was not entitled to alimony. The woman argued that her remarriage was not an obstacle to alimony payments. The trial court denied the husband’s motion and the husband subsequently appealed.
The husband made two points on appeal. The first question was whether the trial court had misapplied the Zullo v. Zullo case, which held that a wife’s remarriage did not terminate the husband’s monthly payments, since the payments in the present case were considered equitable reimbursement rather than alimony the husband should be treated, argued that their agreement did not expressly state that the alimony was for the upkeep of the children’s home. The husband’s second complaint on appeal concerned the change in custody because it was a material change in circumstances that the trial court failed to consider.
As the Supreme Court noted in its Opinion on the Long case, “It is well established that under contract law, in interpreting an agreement, the court must determine the intention of the parties.” Citing Kripp v. Kripp, the Superior Court held: “In cases of a written contract, the intention of the parties is the writing itself… When the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the intention of the parties is evident from the document itself…”
The Supreme Court found that the trial court misapplied the Zullo case to the present case. The Zullo case and its descendants involved alimony payments. In the present case, the maintenance arrangement is contractual maintenance.
As the statement states: “As we can confirm on every valid basis, we are investigating de novo whether the prenuptial agreement of the parties prohibited the wife from receiving alimony with a view to her remarriage.” The husband cited numerous parts of the Divorce Code on the Supporting his argument that the wife’s remarriage precluded her right to maintenance. However, the husband shuffled coincident provisions of the Divorce Act that apply to contractual alimony and alimony. There is a big difference between a maintenance claim and contractual maintenance. Section 3701 of the Divorce Act provides in the relevant part under subsection (f): “Whenever the court approves an agreement for the payment of alimony voluntarily entered into between the parties, the agreement constitutes the order of the court and may be enforced as in section 3703 (relating to enforcement of arrears).” As the Superior Court noted: “In other words, section 3701(f) unlocks the statutory remedies set out in section 3703 (enforcement of arrears) when a payer is in default, regardless whether the payments arose out of a marriage contract or a court order.” The husband then cited other sections of the Divorce Act relating to the modification and termination of alimony, which state: “The remarriage of the party receiving alimony terminates the award of Alimony” and “No applicant shall be entitled to an award of alimony if, after the divorce in respect of which alimony is sought, the applicant has entered into domestic union with a person of the opposite sex who is not a member of the applicant’s family within the degrees of consanguinity is.”
However, these provisions relate to alimony and not contractual alimony. Alimony is collected after a hearing and awarded by a court. This award is a court order and is subject to change by the parties filing the request. Child support payments differ from contractual or agreed child support payments. Alimony payments under a settlement agreement or agreement may be modified or terminated only under the terms of the agreement.
In the present case, the agreement did not contain any language stating that the maintenance ceased in the event of remarriage. The only wording in the agreement to end the alimony was that it “will end after June 2024.” Citing its earlier decision in Woodings v. Woodings, the Superior Court stated: “We have held that the ‘wife’s right to payment is not based upon an arbitral award but instead upon the husband’s signature of a contract’. The statutory ban on maintenance did not apply.” Therefore, the wording of the contract is decisive in the present case. In the absence of any wording to indicate that the parties agreed that alimony would end upon cohabitation or remarriage, the alimony period would continue.
The Superior Court disagreed with the trial court, which ruled that the allocation of child support and alimony was “academic” because the same total dollars would be paid. The reason the Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court was that the parties’ agreement, completed before January 1, 2019, allows the husband to deduct the alimony portion of his alimony obligation on his federal income tax return, thereby reducing his income taxes. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that the husband could request his amendment so that the apportionment between child support and alimony could be determined, which could entail a change in the husband’s ability to deduct part of his payment.
The Superior Court cleared the case and remanded it “to the extent that the husband was barred from seeking a formal allocation of his child support and maintenance obligations totaling $1,800 per month.” However, the Supreme Court found that the trial court “ultimately did not err in denying the husband’s request for termination of his obligation to pay child support in the event of a reduction in child support”. The Superior Court further ruled: “In our de novo examination of the marriage agreement, we conclude that the agreement was not ambiguous and that the absence of a provision to the contrary did not prevent the wife from receiving maintenance upon remarriage. ”
This case is very important for family lawyers. It serves as a reminder of the importance of the details required in prenuptial agreements. If the contract contains a maintenance provision, it is imperative that wording relating to modifiability and termination is included. If the agreement does not contain any relevant provisions, because the agreement is a contract, the wording of the contract shall prevail. As in the Long case, the lack of such language prevented the husband from successfully completing alimony upon the payee wife’s remarriage. This case is also important because it is a reminder of the difference between alimony and contractual alimony.
Michael E Bertin is co-head of the family law department and partner at Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel. Bertin is co-author of the book Pennsylvania Child Custody Law, Practice, and Procedure. He is a past chairman of the family law division of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and a past chairman of the family law division of the Philadelphia Bar Association. Bertin is Vice President of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) and currently Co-Chair of the Custody Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association’s Family Law Division. He can be reached at 215-665-3280, [email protected]
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